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This paper uses firm-level survey data matched with 
official tax records to estimate the unobserved true sales 
of formal firms in Mongolia. Taking into account firm-
level incentives to comply with taxes and a production 
function technology linking unobserved true sales with 
observable firm-level production characteristics, the 
authors derive a multiple-indicators, multiple-causes 
model predicting unobserved true sales. Comparing 
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predicted true sales with sales reported to the tax office, 
the analysis finds that 38.6 percent of firm-level sales 
are underreported. It also finds evidence that firm-level 
survey data suffer from significant underreporting. 
Finally, the paper compares this approach with two 
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1  Introduction 
"All Cretans are liars." (Epimenides, Philosopher from Knossos, Crete, circa 600 BC) 
Over the past decades, firm-level data have become widely available for economic research 
and are used in manifold and vibrant lines of research. This is especially true for research 
on firm behavior in developing countries. The World Bank ‘Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development’ (RPED) was the first large-scale effort to gather firm-level survey data in 
developing countries using a multipurpose survey instrument. The survey was executed in 
eight Sub-Saharan countries in the early 1990s and the resulting survey data have been 
extensively used in research on firm investment, export behavior, rent- and risk-sharing 
(Teal 1996, Bigsten, et al. 2003). With the success of the RPED surveys, more large-scale 
firm-level  surveys  in  developing  countries  followed,  such  as  the  ‘World  Business 
Environment Surveys’ (WBES), ‘(Productivity and) Investment Climate Surveys’ ((P)ICS), 
and the ‘Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys’ (BEEPS), organized 
by the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and/or 
other (multilateral) institutions. Also these recent firm-level surveys have attracted the 
attention of economic researchers and have been analyzed intensively (Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier and Mengistae 2005, Cull and Xu 2005). 4  
Of course, researchers have been well aware that firms may have an incentive to misreport 
their activities, for reasons such as high marginal tax rates, corruption, and crime (Johnson, 
et al. 2000, Dabla-Norris and Koeda 2008, Gatti and Honorati 2008). Firm-level studies on 
underreporting  of  firm  sales  and/or  output  often  rely  on  self-reported  measures  of 
                                                       
2 A comprehensive review of the literature using firm-level data from developing countries 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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underreporting by firms, formulated in terms of the typical behavior of a firm in the same 
area of activity. The fact that these studies often report a sizeable degree of underreporting 
together  with  intuitive  correlations  with  observable  firm  and  investment  climate 
characteristics suggests that these self-reported measures capture underreporting to some 
degree.  However,  it  remains  unclear  how  reliable  these  measures  are  without  further 
probing the underlying assumption that firms report truthfully about untruthful reporting 
(sic).5 
Firm-level studies  which do  not  specifically  focus on  informality and/or misreporting 
almost always assume that firms report truthfully or that firm-level measures suffer from 
classical measurement error only. However, to the extent that misreporting behavior  is 
systematically related with  (observable and/or  unobservable) firm-level and investment 
climate characteristics for which the analysis does not control adequately, the reported 
results will suffer from  systematic (and unknown)  measurement error bias. Also if  one 
relies on survey rather than tax office data in the analysis, it is not clear to which extent the 
survey data suffer less from misreporting than tax office data. 
Using unique firm-level survey data matched with official tax data, we attempt to estimate 
the unobserved true sales and the underreporting in sales to the tax office of formal sector 
firms in Mongolia. Based on the existing approaches used in the shadow economy literature, 
we can distinguish among three possible ways of estimating this underreporting.6  
                                                       
5 In this respect it is interesting to note that at the time the initial RPED surveys were 
planned serious doubts were raised whether reliable data could be generated at all with 
structured questionnaires in a large-scale survey, especially in developing countries. 
6 Schneider and Enste (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the three approaches.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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The  direct  approach  is  a  micro  approach  that  uses  surveys  to  reveal  the  extent  of 
underreporting directly. Respondents are either randomly sampled or selected as part of 
tax auditing or other compliance methods. For instance, the (P)ICS and BEEPS surveys 
include a question which is typically formulated along the following lines: “Recognizing the 
difficulties many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage 
of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports 
for tax purposes?” Together with other information collected on respondents’ behavior and 
environment, these sample surveys provide rich information about underreporting and its 
correlates but are sensitive to the formulation of questionnaires and largely depend on the 
respondents’ willingness to cooperate. Tax auditing methods may be better able to extract 
truthful information from the auditees, but tax authorities may not be able to fully discover 
the true incomes of the audited group. Moreover, the audited group is typically a biased 
sample of the population (Schneider and Enste 2000).  
The second type of approach is the indirect approach or indicator approach and has been 
primarily  used  in  macroeconomic  settings.  The  approach  consists  of  constructing 
indicators  that  reflect  the  development  of  a  shadow  economy  over  time,  such  as  the 
discrepancy  between  national  expenditure  and  income  statistics  and/or  between  the 
official  and  actual  labor  force.  The  quality  of  the  approach  depends  therefore  on  the 
accuracy of these indicators and may be seriously affected by measurement errors and 
systematic underreporting in the indicators (Giles 1999, Schneider and Enste 2000).  
The third approach to estimating the extent of underreporting is the model approach. This 
approach was introduced into economics by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) in their Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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study of the size of the hidden economy of a cross-section of 17 OECD countries for the 
period  1960-1978  and  has  been  used  in  several  studies  thereafter  (Loayza  1996, 
Chaudhuri,  Schneider  and  Chattopadhyay  2006,  Dell'Anno,  Gomez-Antonio  and  Pardo 
2007). The approach is based on structural equation modeling with latent variable(s), for 
which multiple causes and multiple indicators exist (MIMIC model). The empirical MIMIC 
literature  is  primarily  macroeconomic  in  nature  and  typically  the  specification  of  the 
applied MIMIC model is not derived from formal economic theory. One notable exception is 
a paper by Siegel (1997), which uses a MIMIC model derived from formal economic theory 
to estimate the contribution of computer usage in productivity growth at the industry level.  
This paper  makes  a  number of  contributions. First, because we  have  unique firm-level 
survey data matched with official tax data, we can apply and compare the above three 
approaches simultaneously for the same sample of firms. Second, unlike most of the MIMIC 
literature, we use formal economic theory to derive a MIMIC model to estimate the size of 
hidden outputs using microeconomic data. In particular, we model true sales by taking into 
account firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology 
linking true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics. Third, we not only 
allow for underreporting in the official tax office data but also for underreporting in the 
survey data. Fourth, we estimate the extent of underreporting for a sample of formal sector 
firms  in  the  transition  economy  of  Mongolia  where  the  extent  of  underreporting  is 
expected to be prevalent but largely unknown.7 The finding for Mongolia should also be  
                                                       
7 While  not  studying  underreporting  by  formal  sector  firms  specifically,  a  number  of 
studies have looked at the broader issue of shadow economy in Mongolia before (Anderson 
1998, Bikales, Khurelbaatar and Schelzig 2000).  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
6 
 
relevant for many other developing (transition and non-transition) countries where we 
may expect serious underreporting.  
We will argue that the MIMIC approach provides the more accurate estimate of the extent 
of underreporting because it incorporates firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a 
production function technology linking true sales with observable firm-level production 
characteristics, it controls for measurement errors, and it allows for underreporting in both 
official tax and survey data. According to the MIMIC approach, the average percentage of 
underreporting to the tax office is 38.6% at the firm-level and 37.5% at the aggregate for 
the population of firms from which the sample has been drawn. The indirect approach 
performs  poorly  and  underestimates  underreporting  because  it  is  sensitive  to 
measurement errors and underreporting in the survey data. The direct approach gives an 
estimate of the firm-level average percentage of underreporting which is somewhat lower 
than the MIMIC approach, confirming the conjecture of Schneider and Enste (2000, p.92) 
that the direct approach provides a lower bound for true underreporting. However, the 
direct  approach  gives  a  too  high  estimate  for  aggregate  underreporting  because  of 
measurement error and appears less useful as an indicator of underreporting by individual 
firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the extent of 
underreporting  by  firms  around  the  world  based  on  the  commonly  used  self-reported 
measures of underreporting (direct approach). In section 3 we provide a formal derivation 
of a MIMIC model to estimate the true sales of a firm. In section 4 we discuss the empirical 
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specification of the model and present the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with a 
comparison of the MIMIC results with those from direct and indirect approaches.  
 
2  Underreporting by firms around the world – the direct approach  
While most of the existing empirical research on the unofficial economy uses macro data, a 
number of recent papers have used firm-level survey data to analyze the determinants and 
consequences of underreporting of sales and/or output by firms (Johnson, et al. 2000, Gatti 
and Honorati 2008). These papers take advantage of the increasing availability of large-
scale and comparable firm-level surveys in which firms have been asked about their tax 
reporting behavior, such as in the BEEPS, (P)ICS and WBES surveys. Because the firms in 
these  surveys  are  typically  registered  firms,  the  papers  analyze  informal  activity  by 
otherwise formal (registered) firms using the so-called direct approach.  
Because of the sensitive nature of the subject, the question about reporting behavior is 
phrased  in  terms  of  actions  of  ‘typical  firms  in  your  area  of  activity’:  Recognizing the 
difficulties  many  enterprises  face  in  fully  complying  with  taxes  and  regulations,  what 
percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity 
reports for tax purposes? Researchers have  explicitly or implicitly interpreted the  firms’ 
responses to this question as indicators of underreporting at the firm-level.  
These  studies  often  report  a  sizeable  degree  of  underreporting  together  with  intuitive 
correlations  with  observable  firm and investment climate characteristics. This suggests 
that  these  self-reported  measures  do  capture  underreporting,  at  least  to  some  degree.  
Moreover, Johnson et al. (2000) also note that the estimates of hidden activity from the Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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surveys are quite similar to those available from two independent ‘macro’ methodologies.8  
This suggests that the direct approach based on surveys to measuring unofficial activity 
provides useful information about actual underreporting behavior by firms. 
In figure 1 we plot the mean of underreporting by firms based on the direct approach 
across countries sorted by (log) GDP per capita in 2005. We used all BEEPS, (P)ICS, WBES 
and Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Surveys (FACS) for 2005 or later that could be 
freely accessed through the World Bank website9 and which included information on self-
reported underreporting in sales .  In case multiple  surveys were available for a given 
country, we selected the most recent one . Figure 1 shows a clear pattern that  the mean 
level of underreporting is decreasing in log of GDP per capita. Underreporting is the highest 
across  the  low  income  countries  and  the  lowest  across  the  high  income  and  OECD 
countries10. However, even at comparable levels of income, there is a large variation in the 
extent of underreporting by firms across countries , which may reflect genuine  country-
differences in underreporting behavior as well as measurement errors.  
Because the survey asks about the underreporting by typical firms in the same area of 
activity, there may be a “bias towards the average behavior of other firms in that 
environment” (Dabla-Norris and Koeda 2008, p.10) as firms may report the average 
amount of underreporting for firms in the same industry. Also they may report the average 
amount of underreporting as perceived by them in the same locality. We therefore 
                                                       
8 Although one should note that the macro estimates are for the percent of GDP that is 
unregistered, rather than the percent sales not reported by formal sector firms to the tax 
authorities. 
9 www.enterprisesurveys.org 
10 Based on the World Bank classification of income groups. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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calculated the percent of the variance in reported underreporting that can be explained by 
location and industry effects (‘Variance 1’ in Figure 1). If firms report the average amount 
of underreporting for firms in the same industry and/or locality, then a major part of the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COUNTRY sorted by log GDP per capita (2005)
Mean Variance1 Variance2
Linear (Mean) Linear (Variance1) Linear (Variance2)
 
observed variance in reported underreporting would be captured by location, industry and 
interaction effects. For the low income countries the percentage  explained is 26.1% on 
average,  for  the  lower  and  upper  middle  income  countries  this  is  27.6%  and  28.7% 
respectively,  and  for  the  high  income  and  OECD  countries  they  are  56.5%  and  23% 
respectively. Hence, it appears that a major part of the variance in reported underreporting 
can be explained by differences in mean reporting of firms active in different industries Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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and/or  localities.11 On the other hand, only a small part of the variance appears to be 
correlated with firm-level characteristics once we control for industry and location-specific 
effects. ‘Variance2’ in figure 1 is the additional variance that can be explained by firm size 
and ownership dummies. Ownership is captured by 5 ownership categories and firm size 
by 3 size categories in all countries. Using more size categories or a polynomial function of 
a continuous size (i.e. employment) variable does not increase the variance explained much. 
The figure shows that the firm-level characteristics firm size and ownership explains a 
small percent of the observed variance once we control for the variation across industries 
and locations. ‘Variance 1’ is uniformly much larger than ‘Variance 2’. Although one might 
also include other firm-level characteristics besides firm size and ownership, there are no 
obvious  other  firm-level  variables  that  will  be  able  to  explain  much  more  of  the  total 
variance. 
 
Therefore the largest part of the explained variance in reported underreporting is indeed 
across industries and localities, rather than across firms within industries and localities. 
This suggests that the responses are indeed biased towards the average behavior of other 
firms  in  the  environment  making  them  less  indicative  of  underreporting  by  individual 
firms.12  
 
                                                       
11 The relatively low percentages explained for Colombia, Germany, Greece, and Portugal 
are probably due to the fact that in these surveys individual cities are aggregated into size 
classes. 
12 Unless one assumes that underreporting behavior is mostly random and uncorrelated 
with observable firm characteristics. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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There  remains,  however,  the  important  issue  of  whether  the  direct  approach  provides 
reliable information, even if only about average underreporting behavior. It has been noted 
that the direct approach may provide a lower-bound estimate of actual underreporting 
(Schneider and Enste 2000, 92). The direct approach relies on the untested assumption 
that firms report truthfully about untruthful reporting, but this may not hold in practice. 
Therefore  in  the  next  section  we  develop  an  alternative  approach  which  allows  for 
(systematic  and  nonsystematic)  misreporting  in  the  survey  and  which  estimates 
underreporting at the firm-level. 
 
3  A MIMIC model  
Our approach is to derive a MIMIC model for the estimation of the true sales of a firm 
taking into account firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function 
technology  linking  true  sales  with  observable  firm-level  production  characteristics. 
Generally, a MIMIC model is a structural equation model with latent variable(s) (  ) for 
which  multiple  indicators  ( )  and  multiple  causes  exist  (X).  Apart  from  the  shadow 
economy literature mentioned in the introduction, the MIMIC model has also been applied 
to  estimate  the  demand  for  health  care  (Van  de  Ven  and  Van  der  Graag  1982)  and 
manufacturing productivity growth (Siegel 1997). The standard MIMIC model consists of 
both structural equation(s) (eq. 1) and measurement equation(s) (eq. 2):  
                                                                                                  ⑴ 
                                                                                                  ⑵ Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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with  vectors              ,             ,             ,             ,              
                 . 
In our case, the latent variable is (unobserved) true sales, which depends on a number of 
causes or factors X (the structural equation 1), and which is measured with error through 
indicators  Y  (the  measurement  equation  2).  In  the  standard  MIMIC  model,  it  is  also 
assumed that                       
            , with  
  a diagonal covariance matrix. If 
  and   are jointly normally distributed, maximum likelihood estimation can be applied to 
the reduced form of the MIMIC model to obtain parameter estimates. 13  
 
Our MIMIC model will be a more general version of the standard MIMIC model. First, we 
will  allow  for  correlation  between  the  error  terms   and  u  (          ),  and  between 
       ( 
  non-diagonal). Second, we allow indicators not only to depend on the latent 
variable but also on other factors Z as well (            
      ). And third, we will allow for 
truncation given that reported sales to the tax office (an indicator in our model) should not 
exceed the true sales of the firm (the latent variable). We first discuss the derivation of our 
structural  equation  and  next  continue  with  a  discussion  of  our  derivation  of  two 
measurement equations for the MIMIC model.  
 
A.  Structural Equation: Production Technology  
Assume that the production technology of a firm can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
                                                                                                            ⑶ 
                                                       
13 For  more  details  about  the  identification  and  estimation  of  the  MIMIC  model,  see 
Joreskog and Goldberger (1975).  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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where   is  the  quantity  of  output,     and   are  raw  material,  labor  and  capital  inputs 
respectively, and   is total factor productivity;  ,   and   is the elasticity of production with 
respect to     and   in the output function. Let        and   denote the price of output, 
the price of raw material inputs, the wage rate and the user cost of capital respectively. We 
rewrite the production function in terms of values since in our empirical analysis only data 
on the value of sales, raw materials, and capital is available. Further taking the natural 
logarithmic transformation, we obtain: 
                                                                                                    ⑷ 
where    
p 
p 
  w r , S   pY is the value of sales14 and  v   p    v   w   v   r  denote the 
values  of  raw  materials,  labor  costs,  and  capital  respectively.  Hence,  the  intercept     
reflects the impact of prices and productivity on the value of output.  
In the short run, capital is fixed and firms maximize profits over the choices of raw material 
and  labor  inputs,  taking  input  prices  (which  could  be  firm-specific)  as  given.  If  we 
substitute the profit-maximizing levels of M and L into (4), we obtain an expression for the 
optimal (log) sales (S
 ):  
ln S
    
 ln   ln 
1      
ln 
1      
 ln v
1                                                                                  ⑸                                                                 
The capital service flow variable    is taken as a weighted average of the values of capital 
stocks  such  as  machinery  and  equipment,  vehicles,  and  buildings  (Christensen  and 
Jorgensen 1969): 
                                                       
14 We assume firms do not have inventory so that output values are equal to sales values.   Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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 v    r    B  B    r     E                                                             ⑹ 
where  B and    are the stock values of and the depreciation rate for buildings;      and 
    are  the  stock  values  of  and  the  depreciation  rate  for  machinery,  equipment  and 
vehicles; r is the return rate (or rental price) of capital. 15  
The term     in equation (5) is not observed without firm-level information on total labor 
productivity and prices. Price and productivity dispersion have been well documented in 
the  literature  and  therefore     will  vary  across  firms  (Bartelsman  and  Doms  2000). 
Without direct measures of total factor productivity and prices, firm characteristics such as 
the  location  and  industry  of  firms,  firm  size,  ownership  structure,  and  the  investment 
climate faced by firms (e.g. corruption and regulation burden) are used to approximate the 
ratio    .  If  we  denote  these  firm-level  observable  proxy  variables  by  the  vector   , 
equation (5) can be written as:  
ln S
     a   X1b   cln v   u                                                                        ⑺                                                                 
where a and  b  are  parameters  and u is  the  disturbance  capturing  either  measurement 
errors  or  productivity  shocks  or  other  unobserved  effects  that  are  not  captured  by X1. 
Equation (7) is a structural equation for unobserved (‘true’) sales (latent variable) and can 
be viewed as a short-run supply function.  
 
 
                                                       
15 Hours worked per capital are a good proxy for capital service flow, but we do not have 
such data. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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B.  First Measurement Equation for Tax Office Data : Tax Compliance Model 
There are two available types of indicators for the latent variable true sales, one from the 
official tax data and one from the firm-level survey data. Both indicators are required for 
identification purpose (see below). Reported sales to the tax office is a potential valuable 
indicator for unobserved true sales. However, it does not form an unbiased estimator of 
true  sales  because  there  are  strong  incentives  for  firms  to  reduce  the  tax  burden  by 
underreporting.   
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is one of the earliest and best known models of tax evasion, 
in which the individual taxpayer’s decision on the level of tax compliance is subject to an 
exogenous and positive audit probability and a penalty when evasion is detected.  Later 
extensions of this tax evasion model include endogenous labor supply decisions and audit 
probabilities, allowances for repeated interactions between tax payer and tax office, and 
taxpayer attitude and social dynamics (Reinganum and Wilde 1985, Graetz and Reinganum 
1986,  Grasmick  and  Bursick  1990,  Erard  and  Feinstein  1994a).  Also  there  is  a  small 
literature on corporate tax evasion (Crocker and Slemrod 2005, Chen and Chu 2005).  
We formulate a simple tax compliance model to derive a relationship between the sales 
reported to the tax office and the true sales.16 Firms have incentives to underreport taxable 
incomes through underreporting in sales  and/or over-reporting in raw material costs. As 
for labor costs, over-reporting lowers taxable incomes but increases payroll taxes. So 
                                                       
16 The model is constructed purely from a firm’s perspective without modeling the strategic 
interaction between a firm and the tax authority because information on the tax authority 
is lacking. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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whether  to  underreport  or  over-report  labor  costs  depends  on  the  relative  cost  of  the 
income and payroll tax.  
Tax evasion, however, is associated with uncertainty and incurs extra costs. For example, 
firms  have  to  invest  extra  resources  to  make  “double  accounts”;  under-the-counter 
transactions might hinder firms from fully utilizing public services such as legal and judicial 
systems, access to formal finance, et cetera. We assume the extra cost associated with tax 
evasion to be linearly dependent on the amount of profits underreported         
      
   - 
                 with  a  coefficient   ,  where     ,    
  ,    
   denote  the  true  sales/raw 
materials/labor costs while          denote the reported sales/raw materials/labor costs 
to  the  tax  office  respectively.  Therefore  we  assume  that  firms  choose  an  optimal 
combination of sales, raw materials and labor costs reported to the tax office for retained 
profit maximization, taking into account the costs and benefits associated with tax evasion.  
Since the tax authority conducts tax auditing with a budget constraint, only a small portion 
of the firms will be selected for tax audits. Firms know that the tax office faces a budget 
constraint and  form a subjective  (possibly firm-specific)  perception  of  the  efficiency  of 
detecting  underreporting  by  the  tax  office.  Also  they  believe  that  the  probability  of 
detection increases with the extent of misreporting. More specifically, we assume that the 
subjective probabilities that the tax office will detect underreporting (or over-reporting) in 
sales, raw materials, and labor costs are respectively17:  
                                                       
17 The three probabilities are mutually uncorrelated but in reality we expect them to be 
correlated. Our specification also restricts raw materials to be over-reported. However, 
we’ve verified that it is possible to relax both of the restrictions and the same implied 
relationship between true and reported values still holds under suitable assumptions.   Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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where  i      1  i   S     denote the detection probabilities for sales, raw materials, and 
labor  costs  respectively  and     is  the  subjective  expectation  of  tax  office  efficiency.    For 
given tax office efficiency (   ), the detection probabilities increase with the relative gap 
between the true values and the reported values to tax office. We further assume that once 
a firm is chosen for tax auditing, any tax evasion will be detected and the true sales/raw 
materials/labor costs of the firm will be fully revealed.18 Therefore, a firm maximizes the 
expected self-retained profit over the choices of reported sales, raw materials and labor 
costs, taking true sales/raw materials/labor costs as given.  A  firm’s  expected  retained 
profit can be written as:  
maxS       
E        S
     v
     v
       S
t    
r    1       
t       
t    P  S S
    S
t        v
     
t        v
     
t    
                             S
     v
     v
       S
t    
t    
t  
     ⑻ 
where   denotes firm’s retained profit,   and    the corporate profit tax rate and payroll tax 
rate respectively19; and P is the penalty multiplier. Plugging in the three audit probabilities 




    
  
        
     
           
  
  
       
     
           
  
  
       
                 
       
                                                       
18 We can also assume that only part of the underreporting will be detected but this does 
not change the main implications of the model. 
19 In 2003, Mongolia there were two profit tax rate levels for registered firms: 15% if the 
taxable income is below 100 million MNT and 40% above. We calculated the gross taxable 
incomes using tax office data and no firms have taxable incomes above the threshold of 100 
million MNT. The calculated taxable incomes could be even lower if there are other tax 
deductible costs not included in the calculation. Hence assuming a single profit tax rate is 
reasonable. Also the payroll tax rate is flat –formal firms in Mongolia are obliged to pay 19% 
social security tax on wages or a slightly higher rate (or 20 and 21% in some industries 
with high injury risks). Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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Equations (a) to (c) show the relationship between the tax office sales/raw materials/labor 
costs and the true sales/raw materials/labor costs with equation (a) forming the analytical 
underpinning for a measurement equation for S
 . It’s reasonable to expect that firms never 
report more than what they sell (   
  
      ). 20 Therefore we can transform the first-order 
condition for sales into log linear form:  
                      
   
                                                                                  ⑼ 
The marginal effects of   P   and      on sales are:  
   
  
   
 
  
       
    
    
  
   
  
     
        
    





       
    
   
  
        
     
        
    
Reported  sales  increase  with  the  penalty  multiplier,  probability  of  audit,  detection 
efficiency,  and  the  costs  associated  with  misreporting,  but  decreases  with  corporate 
income  tax  rate.  The  patterns  conform  to  our  expectation  and  are  in  line  with  the 
predictions derived from other tax compliance models.  
The values of the parameters P   and      are unknown, but can be approximated by a vector 
of observable proxy variables Χ2 (see section 4). Observable proxy variables may also be 
used for the tax rate  , if this is interpreted as an unobserved and firm-specific effective tax 
                                                       
20 
  
       holds if      , i.e. if the tax rate is higher than the marginal cost of tax evasion; and 
  
       holds as long as the firm perceived tax office efficiency     is not too small. 
  
  
  can be 
larger than one if                 ) or smaller than one if                 ). Accordingly, 
firms may under-/over- report labor costs.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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rate,  rather  than  a  nominal  rate.  Assuming  a  linear  approximation  for  the  unknown 
function       
   
      , we have: 
                                                                                                             ⑽ 
where  t denotes all unobserved effects that are not captured by X2 but which cause S
t to 
deviate from true sales. Equations (7) and (10) form a MIMIC model with one indicator and 
one latent variable. Plugging equation (7) into equation (10) we obtain a reduced form 
which can be estimated. However, the constants d1and a cannot be identified separately 
and parameter values in    and b for variables which occur in both X1 and X2 are also not 
identified. We need at least one more indicator and measurement equation in order to 
identify the key coefficients for predicting the latent variable true sales.  
 
C.  Second Measurement Equation  for Survey Data: Measurement Error Model 
The  second  indicator  for  the  latent  variable  of  true  sales  is  from  the  2003  Mongolian 
Productivity and Investment Climate Survey data organized by the World Bank. 21 Without 
an obvious economic theory to explain (mis)reporting behavior in  the PICS survey, we 
assume a standard log linear measurement error model linking reported survey and true 
sales: 
                                                                                                             ⑾ 
                                                       
21 See section 4 and Appendix A for more information on the survey.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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where    is the sales reported in the survey,    is a constant, and    is the corresponding 
measurement error. The reported sales are expected to be positively correlated with true 
sales (      ). We specify the survey sales to be a function of the true sales because at the 
time of the survey true sales are known to the firm. The log linear specification is flexible as 
it allows the survey sales to be either above or below the true sales.  
Summarizing, equations (7), (10) and (11) form a MIMIC model, where a firm’s true sales 
(S
 ) is the latent variable and reported sales to the tax office (  ) and in the survey (  ) are 
the indicators (measures). We also include the restriction that reported sales to the tax 
office do not exceed the true sales (equation 12): 
                              
                                                          ⑺ 
                                                                                 ⑽ 
                                                                                    ⑾ 
                                                                                     ⑿ 
In line with the MIMIC literature, we assume         to be multivariate normally distributed 
with mean zero but we allow for any possible correlation among these error terms. In the 
Appendix B we discuss the identification of the parameters of the model and derive the 
likelihood function for estimation in the next section. 
 
4 Estimated true sales versus reported sales  
The data for this study are from Mongolia - a land-locked country in East and Central Asia 
that has gone through radical changes from central planning towards market economy in 
1990s. We use two data sources. The first source of data is the World Bank Productivity Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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and Investment Climate Survey for Mongolia (PICS) from 2004. Data for 2002 and 2003 
was collected but we focus on the 2003 data because data for several variables of interest 
are not available for 2002. The survey covers Mongolian registered firms with at least 3 
employees from manufacturing, construction, service, and tourism sectors.22 The coverage 
rates of the number of firms in the four sectors are 81%, 70%, 56% and 53% respectively. 
The PICS survey data is matched at the firm-level with the second source of data, the firms’ 
tax reports submitted to the Mongolia tax office. 
As a first shot at measuring the extent of underreporting by survey firms, we report the 
firms’ responses to the question “what % of total sales the typical establishment in your 
area of activity reports for tax purposes” across city industry and firm size (Table 1). Firms 
report  that  the  typical  firms  on  average  underreport  37.7%  of  their  sales.  Although 
underreporting in the city of Erdenet is significantly higher at 10% compared to Darkan 
and Hovd, the differences among the other 3 cities and across industry and firm size are not 
TABLE 1 
 Mean % of underreporting in sales by the direct approach 
  Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
City  Ulaanbaatar  179  37.7  29.2  0  95 
  Darkhan  44  34.6  26.6  0  85 
  Erdenet  46  43.5*  26.0  0  97 
  Hovd  28  33.7  29.0  0  97 
industry  Manufacture  146  37.9  29.4  0  97 
  Construction  73  39.1  28.2  0  97 
  Service  55  34.1  29.7  0  90 
  Tourism  23  38.3  27.5  0  85 
Firm size  Small (<10 workers)  91  37.4  30.6  0  97 
  Medium (10-100 workers)  176  37.3  28.0  0  97 
  Large (>100 workers)  29  41.5  29.5  0  90 
total     297  37.7  28.8  0  97 
Note: weighted by sampling weights;  
* denotes significance at 10%; Source: WB PICS Mongolia (2004)                                                                            
 
                                                       
22 See appendix A for more information on the data. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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significant.23 This finding confirms the conclusion of section 2 that  the direct approach is 
less informative about the underreporting behavior of individual firms. 
Our second shot at measuring underreporting is based on the  so-called indirect approach 
by interpreting the discrepancy between the  reported sales in the survey  and the sales 
reported to the tax office as an indicator of underreporting. This approach can be seen as a 
special case of the MIMIC model, where one assumes that survey sales reflect true sales.24 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative density functions for the reported sales to the tax office and 
in the survey. The distribution of sales reported in the survey first -order stochastically 
dominates the distribution of sales reported in the tax office. This implies that the total  
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Densities of (log) Sales reported in Survey and to Tax Office
 
taxes actually paid to the tax office is less than the total tax that should have been paid, if 
taxes  actually  paid  increase  monotonously  in  sales  reported  to  the  tax  office.  Table  2 
                                                       
23 Based on tests of equal means and allowing for heteroskedasticity.  
24 I.e.         and        in equation (11). 
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reports  the  extent  of  underreporting  in  sales  to  the  tax  office  applying  the  indirect 
approach  across  cities,  industries  and  firm  sizes,  with  underreporting  calculated  as 
       
     
    .  Estimated  underreporting  is  much  smaller  than  revealed  by  the  direct 
approach (table 1) and averages about 15%. If survey sales reflect true sales and firms  
tend to underreport sales to tax office, the indicator should be between 0 and 100,  but we 
observe negative values for 96 firms. 25 This suggests the presence of serious measurement 
error and/or underreporting in the survey sales.  
TABLE 2 
Average % of Sales Underreported by the Indirect Approach 
    Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
City  Ulaanbaatar  139  14.9  41.5  -125.9  91.3 
  Darkhan  50  18.2  55.3  -121.2  91.3 
  Edernet  46  13.5  54.2  -154.3  90.1 
  Hovd  20  16.4  49.8  -132.8  86.7 
Industry  Manufacture  131  18.0  46.2  -121.2  91.3 
  Construction  66  12.4  47.1  -154.3  91.3 
  Service  45  19.9  36.5  -98.0  90.8 
  Tourism  13  -2.1*  16.7  -22.4  64.5 
Size   Small  69  25.7**  42.3  -121.2  90.6 
  Medium  156  13.3  46.8  -154.3  91.3 
  Large  29  4.4  28.3  -80.9  71.5 
Total    255  14.8  45.3  -154.3  91.3 
Note: the top/bottom 5% of the observations are not reported; all figures are weighted by sampling weights;  
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively; Source:  WB PICS Mongolia (2004) & Tax Office Data 2003 
 
The MIMIC approach has three main advantages over the direct and indirect approaches. 
First, the MIMIC approach uses more information by incorporating firm-level incentives to 
comply with taxes and a production function model linking true sales with observable firm-
level production characteristics. Second, the MIMIC model allows for measurement errors 
in sales reported in the survey and to the tax office. And third, the MIMIC model allows for 
underreporting not only to the tax office but also in the survey. 
 
                                                       
25 37 out of the 97 negative indicators are below minus 10%.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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A.  Estimated MIMIC model 
The MIMIC model eqs. (7), (10)-(12) include vectors    and   to approximate for price and 
productivity differences across firms (     and for the unknown parameters Р,  ,     and   in 
the tax compliance model. We include the following variables in    and   . 
First, variables capturing firm size, location (city) and sector are included in both    and    
because  they  may  affect  firm  productivity  and  tax  reporting  behavior  (Dabla-Norris, 
Gradstein and Inchuauste 2008).26 Larger firms may be more productive than small firms 
and have more bargaining power to obtain more  advantageous product and factor prices; 
smaller firms may underreport relatively more than large firms because the latter are more 
formal and subject to more public attention but they may also underreport less if they are 
more transparent;  different cities have different regulation environment s  that not only 
affect firm productivity but also the reporting behaviors to the tax office by firms; firms are 
also expected to form different perceptions of local tax office efficiency especially across 
different sectors.  
We also included  proxies for average skill level, management experience and capacity 
utilization in    and    as possible determinants of productivity and tax reporting behavior. 
The skill level and management experience of a firm are included in    as underreporting 
opportunities may vary with the skill intensity of production and managers with more 
experience may be more adept in reducing the tax burden when dealing with the tax office.  
Finally  we  included  proxies  for  the  investment  climate  in    and    as  investment 
constraints such as tax burden, corruption, regulation burden and credit constraints have 
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been  shown  to  affect  both  firm  performance  and  tax  reporting  behavior  of  firms 
(Pommerehne  and  Weck-Hannemann  1996,  Johnson,  et  al.  2000,  Dollar,  Hallward-
Driemeier  and  Mengistae  2005). 27 For  this  paper  no  suitable  proxy  for  tax  burden  is 
available but we include a dummy for corruption with a value one (zero) implying that a 
firm has (not) paid bribes or provided informal gifts in 2003. Also a dummy variable credit 
is included equal to one if a firm faces a constraint to formal credit such as bank loans and 
overdraft. We also considered a list of variables approximating for the burden of regulation, 
such as the number of visits by agency inspectors, the time spent dealing with regulations 
by management, but they were insignificant in the empirical analysis and were omitted. 
We are aware of the possible endogeneity problem with the IC variables. Firms may pay 
bribes to get away with underreporting and firms with larger official sales may have more 
access to finance than firms with smaller official sales. Dollar et al. (2005) have proposed 
taking the city-industry average of the IC variables to reduce the possible endogeneity. 28 
We have used the same strategy, but found inflated estimates for the coefficients of the size 
and  industry  dummies  due  to  severe  multicollinearity  problems.  On  the  other  hand, 
including  the  IC  dummies  directly  in  the  regression  does  not  affect  the  estimated 
parameters of the other variables much.  This suggests that possible endogeneity bias, if 
any, is limited to the estimated coefficients of the IC dummies. 
                                                       
27 The quality of government institutions or legal systems has been shown to also affect 
informality (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996, Loayza 1996, Johnson, et al. 2000, 
Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchuauste 2008). 
28 However as Dollar et al. (2005) also point out that even the city-sector averages won’t be 
exogenous if more efficient firms self-select to better climate locations and the analysis 
does not fully control for all the forces driving the self-selection behaviors.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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The  next  table  reports  the  estimates  for  the  MIMIC  model  using  Maximum  Likelihood 
estimation.29 Panel A presents the results for the structural equation with dependent 
variable        (equation  7)  and  panel  B  and  panel  C  show  the  results  for  the  two 
measurement equations with dependent variables log of sales reported to the tax office 
(equation 10) and log of sales reported in the survey (equation 11) respectively. Panel D 
provides the multivariate normality tests on the residuals. Column (1) shows the results 
without IC variables, column (2) and column (3) add credit and corruption respectively, and 
column (4) adds both. Notice that we drop the constant    in equation 10) as this allows for 
identification of the model without relying on the non-linear constraint                
   (see 
Appendix  B)  and,  unlike  the  other  two  constants  in  the  model,    was  found  to  be 
insignificant. 
Panel A shows the estimates for the structural equation for the latent variable of true sales. 
The coefficients for the three industry dummies suggest that true sales in construction, 
service and tourism are respectively 32%, 26% and 171% higher than in manufacturing 
(column (4))30, although only the coefficient for tourism is significant. The coefficients for 
medium and large are both significant at 5% level and imply that firms of medium and large 
sizes  produce  almost  0.6  and  2.7  times  more  than  small  firms  respectively,  holding 
everything else constant.  oreover, firms’ sales increase with increasing capital and higher 
capacity utilization. The dummy variables credit and corruption control for the impact of 
the  investment  climate  on  productivity  and  prices  and  consequently  on  true  sales. The
                                                       
29 The estimated coefficients of the city dummies in    are small and (jointly) insignificant 
and were excluded from    in the final specification. Similarly the estimated coefficients for 
Skill and Experience in    and Capacity in    were insignificant and small and therefore 
omitted from the final (more parsimonious) specification. 
30 Exp(0.279)-1=0.32, exp(0.234)-1=0.26, and exp(0.998)-1=1.71. TABLE  3 
 Truncated MIMIC Model with Latent Variable        
N =  231  LnL  -125.40  -121.94  -124.42  -121.17 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




0.231       
(0.187) 
0.279 
      (0.184) 




0.241       
(0.234) 
0.234      
(0.230) 




0.925**       
(0.371) 
0.998**      
(0.373) 




0.577**       
(0.226) 
0.519** 
      (0.224) 




1.342**      
(0.392) 
1.254**       
(0.391) 




0.266**      
 (0.118) 
0.237** 
      (0.116) 




0.332**      
(0.038) 
0.325**     
 (0.037) 
  Credit    -0.344** 
(0.155) 
  -0.321** 
      (0.158) 
  Corruption      0.207      
(0.172) 
0.176 
      (0.167) 




4.619**       
(0.727) 
4.845**       
(0.727) 
Panel B:  ln(  )          1  1  1  1 




1.046**       
(0.407) 
1.023**       
(0.389) 




0.265       
(0.48) 
0.280     
(0.403) 




-0.738      
(0.711) 
-0.705       
(0.699) 




0.806*       
(0.423) 
0.794**       
(0.407) 




1.486*       
(0.790) 
1.480**       
(0.765) 




-1.044**      
 (0.369) 
-1.032**       
(0.355) 




-1.131**       
(0.421) 
-1.071**       
(0.397) 




-1.005**      
 (0.487) 
-0.896**       
(0.461) 




0.726**       
(0.241) 
0.706**       
(0.231) 




-0.280**      
 (0.112) 
-0.269**      
(0.107) 
  Credit    -0.020       
(0.271) 
  -0.058       
(0.277) 
  Corruption      -0.359       
(0.317) 
-0.315       
(0.298) 
Panel C:  ln(  ) 
 




0.680**      
(0.066) 
0.663**      
(0.067) 




1.646**       
(0.592) 
1.798**       
(0.608) 
Panel D: Multivariate  Chi-square test (4)  5.242  5.085  4.979   5.033 
Normality test  p-value  0.263  0.279  0.289  0.284 
Asymptotic  Chi-square test (4)  5.025  4.982  4.477  4.940 
Multivariate 
Normality test 
p-value  0.285  0.289  0.345  0.294 
Note: dependent variables are       ,  ln(  ) &  ln(  ),  standard errors in the brackets , * and** denote significant  
at 10% and 5%,; Source:  same as Table 2 impact of credit is negative and significant, implying that firms with a credit constraint 
produce 27.5% less than firms without the constraint. The proxy for corruption burden has 
an unexpected positive sign but is small and insignificant. 
Panel B and C show the results of the two measurement equations with indicators ln(  ) 
and ln(  ). In the absence of underreporting, the coefficients in panel B (except for true 
sales) should be zero, while in Panel C the coefficient of         should be equal to one and 
the  constant  should  be  zero.  But  most  coefficients  in  panel  B  and  C  are  significantly 
different from zero (different from one for        in Panel C) and have the expected signs. 
Therefore underreporting in sales exists and also varies across firms. 
All the parameter estimates in panel B for the impacts of variables on sales reported to the 
tax office are obtained conditional on true sales (    ), and the marginal effects of the 
variables  should  be  interpreted  accordingly.  Firms  in  construction  report  significantly 
more to the tax office than firms in the manufacturing sector, ceteris paribus. Also medium 
and large firms report significantly more, everything else equal and conditional on true 
sales.  The  parameter  estimates  for  Darkan,  Erdenet  and  Hovd  are  all  negative  and 
significant and hence firms outside of Ulaanbaatar report significantly less sales to the tax 
office conditional on true sales. Moreover, firms with a higher average skill level also report 
significantly  larger  sales  compared  to  other  firms,  while  firms  with  more  experienced 
managers tend to  report  less  sales  to  the  tax office. Both investment climate dummies 
appear small and insignificant and hence we do not have evidence that credit constraints 
and corruption burden affect underreporting to the tax office at given levels of true sales. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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Panel C shows the results for the measurement equation using the estimated sales from the 
survey  as  indicator. 31 The  coefficient  of  the  log  of  true  sales  is  0.66  and  significantly 
different  from  zero  and  one  at  the  5%  significance  level.  Therefore  survey  sales  are 
significantly and positively correlated with true sales, but with a correlation smaller than 
one. This does not imply underreporting, however, as the constant term is also positive and 
significant  at  the  5% level, and for small values of true  sales  this would  suggest over-
reporting. However, based on the estimated conditional predictions of the firms’ true sales 
(see next subsection), most of the firms (74%) are estimated to underreport sales in the 
survey.  
The above estimation of the MIMIC model assumes a multivariate normal distribution for 
the disturbances. When this assumption is violated, the estimated parameter values from 
truncated maximum likelihood become inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). We test 
the multivariate normality assumption on the reduced-form MIMIC model residuals with 
the results shown in panel D. Both the multivariate and asymptotic multivariate normality 
tests do not reject the null hypothesis of multivariate normality. We have also estimated 
the MIMIC model with different choices for the capital return and depreciation rates used 
in the calculation of the capital variable (equation 6), and we find that our results are 
robust with respect to plausible alternative parameter choices.  
 
 
                                                       
31 We’ve  tried specifications  including various firm characteristics  in panel  C similar as 
Panel B, but the coefficients all appear to be very small and insignificant.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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B.  Prediction of True Sales 
The main objective of this paper is to estimate a firm’s true sales and therefore the extent of 
underreporting in sales to the tax office and in the survey. Prediction of the latent variable 
true sales in the MIMIC model can be done conditional on either the causal variables   only 
or on both   and the indicators. 32 Previous MIMIC empirical literature predicts the latent 
variable(s) conditional on the causal variables X only (e.g., Giles 1999a, Chaudhuri et al. 
2006,  Dell'Anno  et  al.  2007).  In  order  to  increase  precision,  we  choose  to  predict 
conditionally  on  both  the  causal  variables  X  and  the  indicators        and       and 
calculate                                          33Next  we  calculate  the  unconditional 
underreporting to the tax office and in the survey by each firm in our sample using the 
formula       
                                        
                                      ,        . The results are reported in Table 4.  
Underreporting to the tax office is on average larger than in the survey (38.6% versus 
11.9%). With respect to underreporting to the tax office, firms that are small (42.8%), firms 
that are located in Darkhan or Edernet (46.6% and 46.2%), and firms that do pay bribes 
and/or provided informal gifts when dealing with government authorities (41.9%), tend to 
underreport  significantly  more  than  other  firms.  Also,  and  surprisingly,  firms  in  the 
construction  sector  tend  to  underreport  less  (33.9%).  Firms  facing  credit  constraints 
underreport  slightly  more  on  average  than  firms  without  such  constraint,  but  the 
difference is not significant (39.9% v. s 37.8%). 
                                                       
32 Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) derived the formula of prediction conditional on both 
causal variables and indicators. But since we impose an inequality constraint, their formula 
for the conditional expectation will have to be modified. Another (minor) difference is that 
we normalize by taking        instead of           . 
33 For the exact derivation of this conditional expectation see appendix C. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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We also observe underreporting in the survey albeit at a lower level. Underreporting in the 
survey  is  especially  high  for  firms  in  Darkhan  and  Edernet  (23.2%  and  24.8%),  in  the 
tourism sector (37.6%), and for large firms (32.7%). The high level of underreporting for 
TABLE 4 
 Mean % of Total Sales Underreported by MIMIC Approach 
Underreporting in Sales   To tax office  In the survey 
    Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
City  Ulaanbaatar  126  36.9  22.4  9.4  38.0 
  Darkhan  50  46.6**  24.7  23.2**  29.9 
  Edernet  38  46.2**  22.4  24.8**  29.2 
  Hovd  17  38.0  20.5  9.5  38.6 
Industry  Manufacture  125  42.4  24.0  13.3  32.0 
  Construction  62  33.9**  18.4  5.3*  44.4 
  Service  30  36.7  21.7  14.1  26.3 
  Tourism  14  43.7  24.2  37.6**  24.8 
Size  Small  57  42.8  24.4  0.9  30.7 
  Medium  152  37.4*  21.8  12.6**  39.3 
  Large  22  37.6  16.4  32.7**  19.9 
Corruption payment  no  121  35.3  20.2  8.7  39.8 
  yes  110  41.9**  23.3  15.2*  33.8 
Credit constrained  no  151  37.8  21.3  17.0**  35.3 
  yes  80  39.9  23.4  2.8  38.4 
Total    231  38.6  22.0  11.9  37.0 
Note:  *  and  **  denote  significance  of  two-sample  t-tests  for  equal  means  with  different 
observations and variances at 10% and 5% level respectively; figures are weighted by sampling 
weights; Source: calculated using MIMIC estimation results of Table 3 (column (4)) 
 
firms in Darkhan and Edernet may reflect the perceived lower quality of the survey team in 
these locations.34 The high level of underreporting in the survey by large firms may be 
explained by the fact that the estimated sales are based on the three main products  (see 
Appendix  A)  while  large  firms  are  more  likely  to  have  more  than  3  product  lines. 
Underreporting is also relatively  high for firms that pay bribes and/or provided informal 
gifts when dealing with government authorities  (15.2%)  and  for  firms that are credit 
constrained (17.0%).  
Table  4  shows  the  bivariate  relationship  between  underreporting  behavior  and  firm 
characteristics (and investment climate constraints). It  is therefore useful to investigate 
                                                       
34 Based on personal communication with supervisor of the survey. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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which of the factors affect underreporting most. Firm size and location are correlated and 
investment climate variables are also correlated with firm characteristics. Therefore we 
also  did  a  descriptive  regression  analysis  with  underreporting  to  the  tax  office  as  the 
dependent  variable  and  firm  characteristics  as  well  as  the  IC  constraint  variables  as 
independent variables, allowing for heteroskedasticity.35 The resulting regression shows 
that the size effect of underreporting disappears with the inclusion of other variables . 
Firms with more capital underreport significantly less to the tax office while corruption 
and  credit  constraint s  increase  underreporting  to  the  tax  office.  Also  firms  outside 
Ulaanbaatar tend to underreport more but less if they are active in the construction sector. 
Finally we calculated the percent of aggregate sales underreported to the tax office and in 
the survey. Aggregate underreporting is 37.5% to the tax office and 22.8% in the survey. 
These figures are respectively lower and higher than the mean firm-level underreporting 
reported in Table 4, because underreporting decreases in firms size for sales reported to 
the tax office but increases for sales reported in the survey.  
 
5 Discussion 
We have used matched firm-level survey and official tax data to estimate the true sales and 
the  extent  of  underreporting  in  sales  by  formal  firms  in  Mongolia.  Three  different 
approaches have been explored, namely a direct approach, an indirect approach, and a 
                                                       
35  U                                                                      
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modeling (MIMIC) approach. These approaches have been applied widely in the shadow 
economy literature but primarily for macro data (for the indirect and modeling approach) 
and without a proper economic foundation for the MIMIC approach.  
We argue that our MIMIC approach provides the more accurate estimate of the extent of 
underreporting because it incorporates firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a 
production function technology linking true sales with observable firm-level production 
characteristics. It also controls for measurement errors and allows for underreporting in 
both official tax and survey data.  
The next table compares the results from the three approaches. For the direct approach, 
the predicted true sales is calculated by dividing the sales reported to the tax-office by the 
percentage of sales that are reported to the tax office by a typical firm according to the 
same firm (multiplied by 100). For the indirect approach, the predicted true is assumed to 
be equal to the survey sales and for the MIMIC approach it is equal to the conditional 
expectation. Comparing the predicted true sales with the actual sales reported to the tax 
office, we have a total of 186 firms for which we have an estimate of underreporting from 
each of the approaches (Table 5).  
 
The indirect approach gives the smallest estimates of underreporting to the tax office. This 
low estimate reflects the sensitivity of the indirect approach to measurement error.36 It 
                                                       
36 Measurement error and convexity in survey sales implies that     
      
         
      
         , and 
therefore  the expected level of underreporting (        
     
     
        ) is biased 
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also  suffers  from  underreporting  in  the  survey  (Table  4).  The  direct  approach  gives 
comparable  but  somewhat  lower  estimates  than  the  MIMIC  approach  for  mean 
underreporting at the firm-level, while for aggregate underreporting the estimate is clearly 
higher. The relative high estimate for aggregate underreporting by the direct approach  
 
TABLE 5 
Comparison of Three Approaches  
to Measuring Underreporting 
  Firm-level 
(mean) 
Aggregate 
Direct Approach  35.1%  43.9% 
Indirect Approach  15.2%  17.4% 
MIMIC Approach  38.0%  36.9% 
Note: all figures are weighted by sampling weights 
 
follows from the fact that the predicted true sales in the direct approach are calculated by 
dividing  the  reported  tax  office  sales  of  a  firm  by  the  percentage  of  sales  the  “typical 
establishment” reports to the tax office according to the same firm (multiplied by 100). 
Consequently a higher reported percentage of underreporting gives a higher estimate of 
true sales for the same firm and therefore is weighted more in the calculation of aggregate 
underreporting.  
In sum, the MIMIC approach appears to give the more accurate estimate of underreporting. 
The  indirect  approach  performs  poorly  and  underestimates  underreporting  because  of 
being sensitive to measurement errors and underreporting in the survey data. The direct 
approach gives an estimate of the firm-level average percentage of underreporting which is 
somewhat lower than the MIMIC approach, confirming the conjecture of Schneider and 
Enste  (2000,  p.92)  that  the  direct  approach  provides  a  lower  bound  for  true 
underreporting.  However,  the  direct  approach  gives  a  too  high  estimate  for  aggregate Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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underreporting because of measurement error and appears less useful as an indicator of 
underreporting by individual firms (section 2). 
The MIMIC model approach also shows that underreporting is systematically related to 
firm characteristics and investment climate variables. This is true for underreporting to the 
tax office but also for sales reported in the survey. Even though our analysis is based on 
cross sectional data and we are not able to fully control for firm heterogeneity, our finding 
that  firms  also  underreport  in  the  survey  may  pose  a  serious  challenge  for  economic 
analyses that use firm-level survey data without adequately controlling for possible and 
systematic underreporting bias. 
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157-183.Appendix A: PICS Sample, Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
PICS Sample 
Initially 562 firms were randomly sampled from the business register. A few sampled firms 
could not be surveyed for a number of reasons, leaving 400 valid firms in the initial sample. 
37 Out of this sample, interviews with 287 firms were completed successfully. 38 Based on 
the information provided by the tax office on stably operating establishments, 106 more 
firms  were  identified  and  interviewed,  leaving  393  firms  in  the  final  sample.  Post-
stratification  sampling  weights  were  constructed  to  control  for  1)  varying  sampling 
probabilities across strata defined by sector and location, 2) inaccuracies in the business 
register because firms either could not be found, were out of business, did change activities, 
or  moved  to  different  locations,  and  3)  non-response.  The  post  stratification  sampling 
weights for the 321 firms that were in the business register are equal to the proportion of 
the listed firms in the business register over the valid sampling frame by sector and city 
and the sampling weight was set equal to one for each of the other 72 firms that were not in 
the business register due to the inaccuracy of the frame.  
The survey covers the three biggest cities located in the central and northwestern areas of 
Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, Darkan and Erdenet) and 2 secondary cities in the West and East 
(Choibalsan  and  Hovd).  During  the  survey  process,  the  survey  data  collected  from 
Choibalsan turned out to be poor and was replaced by information from original financial 
statements provided by the firms. This makes the survey information from Choibalsan less 
comparable  with  the  information  from  the  other  cities,  because  the  original  financial 
statements are often used for tax purposes and an independent survey measure of sales of 
firms from Choibalsan is missing. Hence firms from Choibalsan were excluded from our 
analysis.  
 
  Variable Definition and Construction 
 
1)    (ln(  )): (log of) total sales for 2003 from PICS Mongolia. Data on total sales is not 
directly available in the PICS survey data. However firms were asked to report the sales 
                                                       
37 They are omitted because they couldn’t be found, out of business, changed activity to 
outside the selected sector, or moved to a different region.  
38 Not all sampled firms were successfully interviewed due to several reasons: 1) they 
cooperated but provided poor data, 2) they were contacted but no interview could be done 
(due to elections, holidays, vocation, et cetera), 3) they could not be found, 4) they were out 
of business, 5) they refused to cooperate, 6) they changed activity and were operating 
outside selected sectors, 7) for other reasons. Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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value of the three most important products/services. They were also asked about the 
importance of these three products/services as a percentage of total sales. 39 Total sales 
is calculated as:  
          
                                      
            
                                                                    
   
 
Firms from the sample which reported only one product and for which the tax office 
sales equal the survey sales were excluded from the sample as these firms were most 
likely to give the same sales data in the survey as reported to the tax office. 40 
2)    (ln(  )): (log of) total sales reported to the Mongolian tax office for the year 2003 by 
 ongolian firms. The reported total sales are the sum of the reported sales from firm’s 
main activity and sales from other activities in 2003.  
3) skill: log of mean wage (total labor costs from the survey divided by total employment 
size), measuring a firm’s average skill level of workers. 
4) capital:  log  of  capital  service  flow,  calculated  from  gross  book  values  of  the  capital 
(buildings, machinery and equipment) with straight line depreciation rates (2.5% for 
buildings and 10% for machinery and equipments) plus the risk free bond rate (14%) 
in Mongolia (equation 6). 
5) experience: manager’s experience in (logarithm) years. 
6) capacity: firms’ capacity utilization. 
7) credit:  a  dummy  variable  with  1  indicating  constraint  in  access  to  finance  and  0 
indicating no constraint in access to finance. Credit is equal to zero when a firm received 
a  term loan  in 2003 or when  a  firm did not apply for a  term loan from  a  bank or 
financial institution because it did not need term loans; otherwise it is equal to one 
when no term loan was received because an application was turned down.  
8) corruption: a dummy variable with 1 indicating firm has ever paid bribes/informal gifts 
in  the  year  2003  for  receiving  service  or  approval,  obtaining  licenses,  dealing  with 
regulation agencies, securing government contract, or getting import/export customs 
clearance, et cetera. 
9) Other dummies:  4  city  dummies  (Ulaanbaatar,  Darkan,  Erdenet  and  Hovd)  indicating 
locations;  4  industry  dummies  (manufacture,  construction,  service,  and  tourism) 
indicating  sectors;  3  firm  size  dummies  defined  by  employment  size  (small  (<10), 
medium (10-100), and large (>100)) referring to small, medium and large firms when 
the dummy equals one respectively. As over a third of the firms hire seasonal workers 
                                                       
39 Firms were also asked to provide the raw material costs of the three most important 
inputs and the corresponding % of importance in total input costs. Firms were not asked 
about their total sales from the balance and income sheet because they were less willing to 
provide this information.  
40 Excluding these firms do not really affect the results.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
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with fulltime equivalent working days ranging from 20 to  312 days,  we  calculate  a 
firm’s  employment  size  by  the  sum  of  the  number  of  permanent  workers  and  the 
weighted number of temporary workers.41 
 
  Summary Statistics 
Table A.1 summarizes the data used in the MIMIC model. The majority of the firms are of 
small or medium sizes. Moreover, over half of the firms are located in Ulaanbaatar with the 
rest located in the other three cities, and most firms concentrate in the manufacturing and 
construction industries.  
 
TABLE A.1 Summary Statistics for the MIMIC Model 
Variable        Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
log(  )  11.11  1.40  8.33  13.97 
log(  )  10.68  1.58  7.45  14.07 
Capital  8.77  2.01  3.65  14.60 
Skill  6.52  .71  2.77  9.02 
Experience  1.64  1.32  0  3.71 
Capacity  4.13  .56  1.10  4.62 
City (dummies)         
  Ulaanbaatar  .55  .50  0  1 
  Darkan  .22  .41  0  1 
  Erdenet  .16  .37  0  1 
  Hovd  .07  .26  0  1 
Size (dummies)         
  Small  .25  .43  0  1 
  Medium  .66  .48  0  1 
  Large  .10  .29  0  1 
Sector (dummies)         
  Manufacture  .54  .50  0  1 
  Construction  .27  .44  0  1 
  Service  .13  .34  0  1 
  Tourism  .06  .24  0  1 
IC (dummies)         
  Corruption  .48  .50  0  1 
  Credit  .35  .48  0  1 




   
                                                       
41 The weight used is the ratio of total number of days worked per worker (in full-time 
equivalent days) for temporary workers over the total number of days worked per worker 
for permanent workers in 2003.  Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data 
42 
 
Appendix B: MIMIC Model Identification and Estimation by Maximum Likelihood 
The MIMIC model is given by equations (7), (10)-(12). For notational convenience, we put 
the non-overlapping variables in    and    into a new        vector denoted by   and the 
corresponding  parameter  vectors   and    are  written  as    and   
 . 42 Plugging  the 
structural equation (7) into the two measurement equations (10) and (11), and rewriting 
the nonlinear constraint (12) using (10), we derive the following reduced form model with 
truncation:  
                                                           
          
                                                 ⒀ 
                                                                  
                                               ⒁ 
                              
                 
                                                                                                             ⒂ 
                                    
                                                                                                                           ⒃ 
The nonlinear constraint is transformed to               
  and    is truncated (from above) 
normal. Without the nonlinear constraint               
 , the model is not fully identified. 
We can identify    and c from the natural logarithm of capital service flow (    
 ) and this 
allows us to identify    from      and then   
  from         
  . But it is still impossible to 
identify      and    separately. The identification problem is  solved when  the nonlinear 
constraint kicks in, through which the parameter    is identified, then   can be identified 
from       , and finally    is identified from         . Therefore the complete identification 
of the model crucially relies on the nonlinear constraint. However, identification is possible 
without the nonlinear constraint if we can drop one of the three constant terms (       ).  
Rewriting the reduced form model in matrix form gives:  
                   
   
               
       
      
     
                      
                                                               
  
                 
                       
       
We denote the variance-covariance matrix of the three disturbances (                  ) 
by  .  Taking  into  account  the  truncation  condition         
      ,    will  be  truncated 
normal.  If   is  uncorrelated  with   ,  then  the  disturbance        consists  of  a  normally 
                                                       
42 If              then              
      , for variables that do not appear in    but in  , 
the corresponding coefficients in    will be zero, the rest of the elements in    are the same 
as in  ; and it’s similar for   
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distributed error term   and a truncated normally distributed   . In this case the structural 
equation  fits  within  the  stochastic  frontier  production  function  approach  proposed  by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), where deviations from the production function frontier 
derive from two sources, namely a term truncated at zero (half-normal) approximating for 
inefficiency and a firm-specific idiosyncratic shock from a normal distribution with mean 
zero. In our case the truncated term    does not reflect inefficiency, however, but the fact 
that  firms  have  an  incentive  to  underreport.  This  suggests  that  existing  estimates  of 
inefficiency  based  on  the  stochastic  frontier  production  function  approach  may  reflect 
underreporting behavior rather than genuine technical inefficiencies to some extent. In 
practice our model is more complicated than the stochastic frontier production function 
approach, with a truncation threshold depending on unobserved parameters and varying 
across firms, and allowance for correlation between   and    . 
The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood.  First of all, the probability that     
and     are observed for firm i is given by:  
              
            
              
          
      
          
 
                    
                  
      
          
     
  
                                         
                      
                   
  
 
Taking the logarithmic transformation of the probability and summing the log likelihood 
over all firms in the sample, we obtain the log likelihood:  
                                                           
                       
 
   
                        
     
                                                                     





   
                  
        
 
  
   
      
                                
   is  the  probability  of  truncation  for  firm  i.  Assume 
that  the  three  disturbances       and   are  multivariate  normally  distributed  with  mean 
zero. Therefore                       is  also multivariate  normally distributed with mean 
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distributed.  Let       
      
        
  with  variance-covariance  matrix     and  the  conditional 
density  is                                         .  Based  on  the  multivariate  normality 
assumption,  the  conditional  mean         and  variance       
   of          are  derived  to 
be       
   
         
         
  and             
       respectively,  where                          
   . The probability of the ith observation is: 
              
          
              
          
      
          
 
                    
                  
      
          
    
  
                                         
                      
                   
  
 
Based on the multivariate normality assumption, we have:  
a)                     
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Plugging equations a)-c) into the probability function, taking the logarithm of the 
probability, and summing over firms, we obtain the following log likelihood:  
       
 
 
             
 
 
   
           
           
 
 
   
    
           
           
 
 
   
  
                       
        
        
   
         
         
 
           
     
    
        
 
    
       
      
The first part of the log likelihood in equation excluding the last term is identical to the log 
likelihood  of  the  standard  MIMIC  model  without  truncation.  The  last  term  corrects  for 
truncation and causes the ML estimates to differ from their least-squares counterparts and 
ensures that the ML estimates are consistent. 
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Appendix C: Derivation of the Conditional Prediction              
Taking the exponential transformation of the structural equation                   
     
     , we obtain                         
      , therefore the expectation of true 
sales conditional on both indicators and causal variables can be rewritten as:  
                                                
                                  
                             
                                                      (  ) 
where                        
      
                          
       
 
        
             
     .  Let     
denote                  
    . The multivariate normality of        implies that          is 
normally distributed with the conditional mean and variance as follows:  
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where              denote the three elements of the       vector                    
 
, and 
let m denote                                        .  Standardizing         , we have:  
                           
           
 
         
 
        
              
        
      
                   
    
 
         
                 
 
        
              
             
 
        
              
Plugging the above equation back into the conditional expectation equation (  ) 
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Next we proceed to derive                  
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Plugging  the  result  back  into  equation  (  )  we  get  the  formula  for  the  conditional 
expectation:  
                          
                  
 
        
   
 
   
      
     
       
               
 
      
 
        